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WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, MAY 10, 1838.

[WHOLE No. 175.]

CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENT.

DEFENCE OF THE WESTERN FRONTIER.

A plan for the defence of the Western Frontier, furnished by Major General Gaines, February 28, 1838.

April 6, 1838. Laid before the House by the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, and ordered to be printed.

HEADQUARTERS, WESTERN DIVISION, }
St. Louis Arsenal, February 28, 1838. }

SIR: In obedience to your letter of instruction of the — of November, 1837, I have the honor to report that, having in the year 1822 carefully inspected the country, and duly considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of the most prominent points embracing the military topography of the Western frontier, from the Sabine ridge, west of Natchitoches, via Fort Jesup, Fort Towson, Fort Gibson, and Council Bluffs, to the Falls of St. Anthony, inclusively, and having for the most part of the time subsequent to 1822, up to the present moment, availed myself of every opportunity in my power to make myself more thoroughly acquainted with the whole frontier, and with the character and habits of the various nations of Indians upon, and adjacent to, this frontier, I deem myself to be in possession of the requisite information to enable me to decide upon all the measures necessary to afford protection to the inhabitants of this thinly settled and much exposed frontier.

Believing the report of the Chief Engineer, dated the 15th of September, 1837, and which accompanied your letter of the 17th of October, to be the most rational and effective project for the defence of the Western frontier that has ever emanated from the Department of War, and sufficient, when added to the views of the honorable John C. Calhoun, of the year 1819 to 1821, to form the basis of a sound system of defence, I propose to add to that basis the views which follow; in which I shall freely animadvert upon what I consider the errors of that basis, and shall as freely approve what I deem to merit approbation; and I shall endeavor to supply the omissions of those talented officers; whose errors and omissions I am sure have proceeded mainly from a want of accurate information as to the topography of the country, the location of the neighboring Indians and their numbers, and means of combination and annoyance to the frontier. It is not possible for any officer, without a personal knowledge of the principal features of the country, with the probable elements of military power by which it may be assailed, to decide upon the best means of fortifying and defending it. The United States never having had any such topographical surveys as to obtain the desired information, personal inspection presents the only method of studying the physical and moral properties which enter into the subject of attack and defence of the frontier; and it is believed that neither Mr. Calhoun nor General Gratiot has ever inspected much of it in person.

Convinced, from long and dear-bought experience, that the safety of the frontier and the efficiency of the army would be greatly promoted by the occasional employment of every officer and every soldier, during periods of peace, in the laborious duties of exploring, surveying, and marking routes from post to post, and of ascertaining the exact topography of the whole Southern and Western frontier, and the adjacent country, I issued orders prescribing the manner in which the work should be done; of one of which the following is a copy, and which I take leave to record here, inasmuch as it gives the best view of the

subject I am able to offer, and because this "order" is reported never to have reached Washington.

HEADQUARTERS, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

Memphis, (Tennessee), February 28, 1834.

ORDER No. 11.

A knowledge of the topography and the military resources of every part of the national frontier, is essential to the present and prospective usefulness of every officer and soldier of the republic, and particularly so to those who anticipate the honor of a call to active field service, and who desire the attainment of that professional distinction which a perfect knowledge of the theatre of approaching war seldom fails to ensure to the able disciplinarian and vigilant tactician; and can there be an officer or soldier in the army who does not anticipate this description of service, and desire these attainments? It is presumed not.

The officer, particularly, whatever may be his grade, should never move upon the national frontier without keeping constantly in his mind's eye, and applying to himself, individually, views such as the following: The time may come when it may be my duty to meet my country's enemy upon the route now before me, or at the post for which I am now destined; when every thing dear to me as an officer, soldier, and patriot, may depend on the knowledge of the topography of the country which it is now in my power to obtain; for example, the practicability of finding an easy pass across this or that mountain, river, or morass; for here it may, in time, be my fortune to be honored with the command of an army to check the approach of an invading foe, whose commander may, possibly, be well acquainted with these intricate passes; and it is an axiom with experienced commanders, that when opposing armies come in collision, all other things being equal, the commander best acquainted with the topography of the country comprehending the theatre of action will assuredly be the victor. I will, therefore, avail myself of the present opportunity to become thoroughly acquainted with the apparent military points of the topography of the country through which my present tour of duty calls me. For, even if this section of country should never become the theatre of war, the knowledge of it which I may now acquire will not be wholly useless to me, or to my country's service, as the means which I employ in its attainment will contribute to enable me with the more ease, in future, to acquire habitually, similar information, when it may turn out to be more useful. I will, therefore, habituate myself to the free use of my eyes, and of my compass, and of my pencil, as it is by habitual efforts only that the eye is rendered capable of embracing, at a single glance, the strong military features of the section of country inspected, and of properly estimating the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various points and positions so discovered.

The young officer or soldier who reasons thus, and who acts in accordance with the suggestions of his own mind, thus disciplined, may well aspire to be the first in war and the first in the hearts of his countrymen. The officer who persuades himself that a knowledge of the prescribed discipline and interior police, with a knowledge of the school of the soldier, the school of the company, and the school of the battalion, is sufficient to enable him in peace to be prepared for war, is as much mistaken as the seaman who persuades himself that the knowledge of the ship of war, her tackle, apparel, furniture, and guns, with her movements on a small lake or bay, would be sufficient to fit him in every way to cope with an experienced enemy at the head of a fleet at sea. A knowledge of the topography of every part of the national frontier and its vicinity, is essential to every officer and soldier who anticipates the honor of active field service, with successive promotion to the higher grades; and these will not fail to attract the attention of every true-hearted American soldier.

The foregoing views suggest the propriety of the orders which follow.

I. Officers ordered on command, or on any detached service whatever, by land, or upon small water-courses, are hereby required to keep a journal or field-book, in

which they will note, concisely, the position and military character of the country over which they travel, the nature and quality of the surface, the courses and distances travelled from post to post, from river to river, from morass to morass, from mountain to mountain, and, generally, from any one remarkable place, natural curiosity, impediment, or obstruction, to another; noting the actual or estimated width, depth, general courses and velocity of the principal rivers and creeks, the character of the soil, the mineral and fossil appearances, the timber and other productions, particularly such as belong to the military resources of the country; noting, also, the degree of elevation and depression in ascending or descending mountains and other prominent acclivities, with sketches such as are usually and most conveniently made with a pen or pencil in an active reconnaissance in the course of a campaign, or active operations near an enemy; a copy of which journal or field-book and sketches will, in every case, be furnished to the headquarters of this department, and the original, or another copy, will be placed on file with the order-book and papers of the post to which the officer furnishing the above required information shall belong, on the completion of such tour of service.

II. Commanders of posts not already supplied with the requisite instruments for making such surveys and sketches will, on the receipt of these orders, prepare and transmit to Western department head quarters special requisitions for such instruments, not exceeding, for any post, one small theodolite, or one circumferenter or compass and chain, and one set of drawing or protracting instruments of common quality.

By order of Major General Gaines:

GEORGE A. McCALL, A. D. C.,
Acting Assist. Adj't General.

Notwithstanding most of the officers of my command were highly qualified for the performance of the duties prescribed in my "orders" above referred to, and were not only willing, but most anxious, to be employed occasionally on the proposed topographical surveys, the requisite instruments were not furnished, and the surveys are yet to be made. Men without experience, and who believe the art of war consists in the *advanced step of the man* and the *manual of his firelock*, believe these surveys should not be made by the officers of the *line of the army*; that officers and soldiers should be kept, during a state of peace, day after day, and year after year, closely employed in the school of the soldier, the school of the platoon, and the school of the battalion, in the ordinary camp or garrison duties; and that the surveys, such as those which I have directed, should be made by the regular topographical engineers. Every talented officer, however, known to me, concurs with me in the opinion that officers and soldiers of the *line of the army*—officers and soldiers whose duty it will be to act against the enemy in battle upon the frontier—should occasionally explore and survey the theatre of action upon which their prowess is to be tested in the defence of their country; and that the officers of the corps of engineers, and more especially the topographical engineers, should be employed in the location of railroads, canals, and other *permanent works*, whilst all temporary works of defences and temporary roads, as well as topographical surveys of the frontier, should be made by officers and men of the *line of the army*. I deem it to be proper here to give it as my opinion, and I do it without the fear of contradiction from any man of military mind, that by the employment of that portion of my command stationed upon the Southern and Western frontiers, during the years 1834 and 1835, agreeably to the letter and spirit of my orders, in ascertaining the topography of East Florida, most of the evils which have attended the war in that ill-fated Territory would have been obviated.

I propose the immediate selection of sites, and the construction of military posts, at or in the immediate vicinity of the eleven principal points which I shall designate between the mouth of the Sabine river and lake Superior, inclusively; and, inasmuch as it is essential to the efficiency of the proposed cordon of

posts, that some definite space of time should be assumed as the probable period of the duration of the work, I deem it proper to base my estimates upon sixty-two years, being the remaining part of the present century. From this estimate it is obvious that the whole of the works of defence and barracks, as well as the roads for communicating with the interior settlements, and supplying the frontier with troops and munitions of war, and to enable the several military posts to communicate with each other, should be constructed of durable materials and upon the most approved models. For example: every fort and barrack should be built of stone or brick, and (with the exception of that at the mouth of the Sabine and that on lake Superior) they should be constructed with a view to a savage foe only—armed as our neighboring Indians have ever been, and doubtless will continue for the next sixty-two years to be armed, with weapons against which neither casemates nor very thick walls are necessary to render the works invulnerable. And to this I will here add, what is all important to the effective and economical protection of the frontier, that each inland work of defence should be so constructed as to afford *protection and comfortable accommodation to the greatest practicable number of troops or neighboring inhabitants*, and at the same time, to be defended by the *least practicable number of men*,* so as to afford for the field, in the immediate protection of the frontier inhabitants, at least *four-fifths* of the entire garrison. For example: suppose the barracks are sufficient for the accommodation of a regiment, or ten companies of dragoons and five companies of infantry; a large war party of Indians are found to be approaching the neighboring settlements; the work capable of containing barrack and store room for fifteen companies, with a year's supply of every essential munition of war, should be so constructed as to be left with perfect safety in charge of three companies, whereby *twelve companies of the fifteen would be disposable*. This is the description of work which I propose for the nine inland posts between the mouth of the Sabine and lake Superior, exclusively. (See the annexed plan, marked AB.) The forts at last mentioned points must be constructed for defence against artillery.

In reference to the military roads from the interior settlements to the frontier posts, all should be railroads, with steam-power applied to vehicles of land transportation; and be constructed by the troops in periods of peace.

I. *The southern section of the Western frontier, from the mouth of the Sabine to Red river, and thence with the Mexican or Texian boundary, to the Arkansas river.* This is by far the most vital and important section of the whole inland frontier of the United States; because it is threatened by the most powerful savage nations, aided, or likely to be aided, by men professing to be civilized, but, in fact, destitute of any of the known attributes of civilization other than its vices; and because it is in the immediate vicinity of the only natural outlet of the great valley of the Mississippi, including the States of Mississippi and Alabama, through which the immense exports and imports, embracing the principal commercial wealth of this favored region is destined to pass, constituting altogether a floating commercial capital of imports and exports, amounting, in the year 1836, to more than one hundred millions of dollars, (\$100,000,000;) wealth enough of itself to excite the cupidity and tempt the aggression of all the votaries of rapine and plunder throughout Europe and America; wealth which, though now amounting to little more than one hundred millions of dollars per annum, will, before the close of the present century, sixty-two years from this time, comprehend nothing less than the whole annual floating wealth, imports and exports, of a population of fifty-six millions (56,000,000) of free white

* See document A.

citizens of the United States. The present population of our Western country, principally in the valley of the Mississippi, being seven millions, with a floating commerce, amounting to upwards of one hundred millions of dollars per annum, warrants the conclusion that, at the close of the present century, (sixty-two years hence,) when the whole population of the United States shall amount to eighty four millions, (84,000,000;) giving to the valley of the Mississippi fifty-six millions, it is but fair to infer that the imports and exports to and from the Gulf of Mexico will, at that time, amount to at least eight hundred millions of dollars per annum, (\$800,000,000.)

These estimates embrace not only the commerce of the valley of the Mississippi, but also that of the several States and districts between Mobile and Key West, inclusively. The last mentioned ports and outlets are brought into view here, inasmuch as *the commerce of all will be controlled by the great military or naval Power into whose hands Texas is destined to fall.* To these important ports, with the products of their adjacent rich sugar and coffee and rice lands, I may add the island of Cuba, together with all the floating and most of the stationary commercial wealth of the bay and gulf of Mexico; making, near the close of the present century, a grand total of about twelve hundred millions of dollars per annum (\$1,200,000,000) of commercial wealth to be placed under the control of the nation into whose hands the infant republic of Texas is destined soon to fall. These estimates are based upon data found principally in the known statistics of our country, of the island of Cuba, and of that part of Mexico bordering on the gulf or bay of Mexico; and more especially in respect to the *increase of population*, my views are based upon the census taken once in every ten years, since the adoption of the federal constitution; supposing the present free white population of the United States to be fifteen millions, (15,000,000,) and that its numbers will be doubled once in every twenty-five years. By this estimate we find that, in the year 1863, the population will amount to thirty millions; in 1888 it will amount to sixty millions; and in 1899 it will amount to near ninety millions. But to make a full allowance for every probable casualty, and to understate rather than overrate the grand total, I have reduced it to eighty-four millions of free white citizens, at the close of the present century. If I am correct in this estimate, I cannot be far wrong in supposing that the population of the valley of the Mississippi will, at that period, number fifty-six millions; of which more than a moiety will probably inhabit the rich agricultural and mineral section of the country lying north of the Arkansas, and west of a line running northward from St. Louis, to the island of Mackinaw; at that period, the population of Arkansas and Louisiana will be near six millions.

These estimates, it is believed, will hold good in a nation of freemen of sober, industrious habits, until the population becomes so dense as to render it difficult for the laborer to find profitable employment, or for the agriculturist to find rich soil sufficient for the production of subsistence in such abundance as to render it cheap, and conveniently attainable by all classes of the community possessing a reasonable share of industry. Apply this rule to the valley of the Mississippi, and it will be found that, when fifty-six millions of inhabitants shall have in cultivation one hundred and ten millions of acres of rich lands, there will remain near seven hundred millions of acres of uncultivated lands—much of it richer than that now in cultivation. This estimate is based upon the known fact that nearly nine-tenths of the population of the Western States are agriculturists, and that near one-fifth part of this great body of inhabitants may be considered capable of field labor, and that each laborer can cultivate six acres of land.

Of the southern section of the Western frontier, the climate is mild and salubrious, the water abun-

dant and healthful, the soil rich; and the most part of that bordering on what our treaty with Mexico designates the "*river Sabine*," but what is termed by the inhabitants the *lake* or the *bay* of Sabine, is admirably adapted to the culture of sugar-cane and rice; and the whole of the country from the sea-board to Kiamechia, adapted to the culture of cotton, corn, potatoes, beets, and, indeed, all the useful vegetables and fruits known to the States of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. The timber is abundant, with the exception of a few leagues of prairie, near the mouth of the Sabine river, near the sea-coast, where there are occasional skirts of forest trees, among which the live oak, with cypress and white oak, are found in quantities, and of a description rendering it valuable for the construction and repairs of ships and other vessels. From the prairie near the Sabine river, to the mouth of the Kiamechia, the country abounds in white, red, and post oak, pitch-pine, cypress, ash, hickory, mulberry, with some black walnut, black locust, red elm, and sassafras. The soil and timber on the Texas side of the boundary line are superior to that upon our side.

Of all these advantages of *national defence* and *national wealth*, it is believed we may now avail ourselves, by a magnanimous act of *justice* to our neighbors, and *duty* to ourselves—a duty enjoined by the first law of nature, self-preservation—by affording *PROTECTION* to the present slender infant settlements of purchasers and squatters on our public lands, who are destined soon to give to our country a large portion of the *population* and *wealth* of which the foregoing estimates afford an imperfect view.

But let the present moment pass away, unimproved; let two of the strongest powers of Europe, whose colonies border on our Northern, Northwestern, and Northeastern limits, engage in an *alliance, offensive and defensive*, with one of our Southwestern neighbors; let them establish a few strong military posts in Texas, near the mouth of the Sabine; let them be prepared, with the aid of a large fleet, to approach Louisiana by land and by water, simultaneously, whilst we, in place of fortifying, and thus securing this all-important line of the national frontier, may have been amusing ourselves with the false notion of security embraced in the report from the War Department, that "Texas is in the occupancy of a people with whom the United States entertain the closest relations of friendship, which, it is believed, can never be interrupted; and, but for the peculiarity of the position in reference to another neighbor, and the fact that the northern [northeastern] frontier of her territory is but sparsely settled, and, consequently, unable to resist or prevent the passage of an Indian war-party on its way to strike on our people, the presence of a military force near her eastern frontier, other than what is required to enforce the revenue laws, would hardly be needed." (See the Chief Engineer's report, pages 1 and 2.)

Let us reason thus, and neglect the present auspicious moment for effective preparation and permanent means of protection, and not only Texas, but New Orleans, will be, perhaps, forever lost to us.

In the foregoing extract, it is obvious that the Chief Engineer has lost sight of one of the most essential maxims of the science of war—a maxim which should govern us in all our measures of national defence, as well in our preparations for war, as in our efforts in the field of battle.

The maxim to which I allude is, in substance, in the following words: *For the safety of our position, our army, or our frontier, we must rely upon our own strength and resources, and not upon the supposed friendliness of our neighbors, nor upon the supposed weakness of our antagonist*; for our friendly neighbors may soon become our most dangerous enemies, and our weak antagonist may, without our knowledge, obtain strength enough to beat, or at least to annoy and vex us, as we have in Florida been annoyed and

vexed, for want of some attention having been paid by us to this important maxim. To a reckless disregard of this simple maxim may be attributed most of the disasters that have ever occurred upon our frontier.

In the present condition of Texas, and more especially in the existing revolutionary state of Mexico, to be true to ourselves, we are in duty bound to hold towards both nations, and towards their Indian allies, the inflexible attitude of a *strong-armed neutrality*; ready and willing to speak to them in a language not to be misunderstood; admonishing them to conform to the laws of war, and warning them at their peril to abstain from violating those laws upon our frontier themselves, or suffering their red allies to violate them. (See the 33d article of our treaty with Mexico.) And we must be ready, with sufficient means and force, "to suit the action to the word," and to punish every violation of our neutrality, in accordance with the laws of nations.

In the present state of this section of the frontier, a Tecumseh, an Oseola, or even a pirate, such as Lafitte, with as many mounted men as such an evil spirit, under the auspices of some quadruple holy alliance could in ten days' time muster around his bloody flag, bearing such inscriptions as abolitionists and other incendiaries would suggest, and the whole of the rich and flourishing settlements of Red river, Attakapas, and Opelousas, from Fort Towson to Alexandria, and thence to the Sabine, inclusively, (constituting the richest garden spot of the cotton-growing region of our country,) would be swept off before the letters announcing the prospect of danger would pass and repass from the national sentinels commanding the frontier posts, to the Department of War, and thence to the Governors of the States from whence force for the defence of such menaced frontier is to be drawn. The force itself, without railroads, would probably begin to assemble at the point of attack, by the time the good people of Red river and Attakapas shall have parted with their last bale of cotton, and their last hogshead of sugar, with their last breath!

To enable us to afford to this most important section of the Western frontier that effective *protection* which the constitution of the United States guarantees to the people of the United States—that protection, the work of which should commence, and, if possible, be completed before the work of destruction is begun—protection to the living rather than to the dead—I recommend the immediate selection of sites, and the construction of five forts upon this section of the frontier, viz:

1st. One, at or near the point of beginning of our Southwestern boundary line, which, in the words of the treaty, is not at the mouth of the east fork of the Sabine river, but, "*at the mouth of the Sabine river on the Gulf of Mexico in the Sea*;" to be equal in its number and calibre of its ordnance to Fort Jackson, with barracks for twenty companies of *infantry* or *artillery*. I deem it to be useless to make any distinction between these corps, as I deem them to be in all respects equal for artillery and infantry service.

2d. One, at or near the head of steamboat navigation, on the left bank of whichever fork of the Sabine river is selected by the proper commissioners as our national boundary line, as nearly as practicable where the 32° of north latitude intersects that fork of the Sabine river: this fort to be adapted, principally, to the purposes of defence against Indians, or light troops having no other description of cannon than light field-pieces; the work to consist of strong brick or stone walls 500 feet square, the curtains to be defended by two martello towers, placed at opposite angles; with strong brick or stone barrack extending through the centre of the enclosed space, so as to have a side and an end of the barrack building defended by each tower, agreeably to the ground-plan, and estimates, hereunto annexed, marked AB. This plan is intended to represent a work that will furnish

comfortable accommodation for twenty companies of artillery, infantry, or dragoons, with ample store-rooms for one year's supply of all the requisite munitions of war, for twenty companies or two thousand men; the work to be built by the troops, aided by a few master mechanics; to be defended against Indians by four companies, leaving sixteen companies disposable. The roofs of the barracks, towers, and all other buildings, to be nearly flat, and covered with sheet-lead of great thickness; with all shutters of doors and windows to be secured from fire, as well as from rifle-shot, by plates of thick sheet-iron. Such are the works which I shall recommend upon the Western frontier between the mouth of the Sabine and lake Superior.

I shall now proceed to designate the remaining sites, for each one of which I propose a work of this description. (See the ground-plan and estimates annexed, marked AB.)

For each site, I recommend a reservation of public land equal to a complete township, or so much as may be sufficient to place every foot of land and water within three miles of the fort, under the permanent and entire control of the commandants of the posts, respectively.

3d. The third site to be selected should be at or near Fort Towson,* on Red river, near the mouth of the Kiamechia.

4th. The fourth site at or near the point at which the national boundary line commences its northerly direction from the left bank of the Red river.

5th. The fifth site at or near the Arkansas river, where the national boundary, running north from the Red, intersects the Arkansas river.

II. *The central section of the Western frontier, from the Arkansas to the Missouri river, at the mouth of the Big Platte; also, the northwestern section, from the Missouri to the Mississippi river, at the mouth of the St. Peter's.*

The country upon these two sections of the western frontier varying but little in its physical aspect or topography, will be considered under one head. The greater part of these two sections (between seven and nine-tenths of the whole distance) consists of open prairie; the residue is but sparsely timbered. The face of the country principally presents a rich soil, a luxuriant growth of grass and prairie weeds; and though generally undulating, is for the most part so little broken, or so nearly level, as to exhibit no serious obstacle to the location of good roads for the rapid movement of troops and munitions of war in all directions. So fertile is the soil, that I am convinced there are but few, if any, one square mile of the whole country that would not afford ample support to a family of 50 to 100 persons; and there are hundreds of square miles on the route that would each make what of the richest counties of Kentucky, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, or New York, would be considered a first rate farm of six hundred acres of good arable land, capable of producing food for 200 to 600 persons annually; much of it being first rate land, and the residue good second-rate land. The whole, or at least nine-tenths of it, is as nearly level as could be desired for agricultural purposes.

It is obvious, therefore, that troops may be moved with great facility in all directions, without any other labor than the usual number of efficient pioneers will be able to bestow, except in the construction of bridges or causeways in crossing the rivers and creeks; and that in making the road intended to be opened from post to post, the topographical engineer, having ascertained the direction to be taken, need never be more than a few days' march in advance of the troops engaged in the construction of the roads and bridges.

The principal roads from post to post may be made

* See document C.

nearly straight, excepting in the immediate vicinity of the principal rivers, where there are some steep hills, lakes, or swamps, that must be avoided by taking a serpentine or zigzag direction. (See document marked D.)

Roads for the supply of the several military posts will be considered under another head, in the concluding part of this report. The roads above referred to, from post to post, will be useful for the occasional movements of the disposable force from post to post, to co-operate with each other in covering the frontier, and keeping the enemy in check in time of war; and, what is of equal importance, the proposed roads from post to post will enable us, during the periods of peace, by the occasional movement of our disposable force, to keep in check such disorderly persons of all colors among and near the Indians as have for years past contributed to get up a war whenever and as often as it was the will and pleasure of a few lawless chieftains or speculators to have an Indian war. These movements from post to post will have the additional good effect of making our mounted dragoons, artilleryists, and infantry, *acquainted with the topography of the frontier*; and, what is equally essential to the service, they will be then made *acquainted with the duties of a vigilant movement* near the haunts of our savage neighbors, from whom hostilities are to be expected, and against whom we *must hold ourselves always ready for action*. Thus, in peace, we should prepare for war; otherwise, we shall have to sacrifice much precious time to prepare, whilst the frontier is bleeding.

The construction of the roads from post to post should consist of but little or no labor or expense beyond that of substantial stone bridges across the small creeks and muddy branches, with a slight ditch on each side of the road, with the earth taken out of the ditches thrown to the centre of the road, which, in most flat or level places should be elevated sufficiently in the middle to carry off to the ditches the water falling upon the road.

This much labor would be desirable to mark the way over the great prairies, and to prevent the road from becoming boggy, as it doubtless would in all the rich and flat prairie lands over which it must pass. The greatest expense of labor required upon the roads will be in the construction of the stone bridges, which must be arched, and built of large stone, across the boggy creeks and branches, many of which have deep and steep banks, and muddy bottoms. Some of these creeks between Council Bluffs and the mouth of the St. Peters, of not more than twelve to fifteen feet in width, have detained me for an hour or two in crossing each one of them; having been compelled to take off my packs and saddles, and have several men to help each horse through the creek, which, without having more than two feet depth of water would, by the soft mud in the bottom, sink the horse to the top of his back. Creeks and branches of this description must be bridged, and, whenever stone can be obtained in the prairie, the bridge of this material will be cheaper than such as we should make of the present timber of that region of country. Of the thin skirts of timber found north of the Missouri, much is soft and very perishable, such as the cotton-wood, the linden, and white walnut, with some maple. Besides, even if good timber could be found in the greatest abundance, such as black walnut and red elm, of which there are considerable quantities between the Arkansas and Missouri rivers, it is to be apprehended that the wooden bridges would be destroyed every year by fire, by which the Indians take care to burn the prairie-grass in the course of every fall or spring. In the event of war they would be destroyed, as the bridges of Florida have been.

III. Military posts for the central and northwest-

ern sections of the Western frontier, from the Arkansas to the Mississippi river, inclusively.

Having recommended five sites for military posts on the southern section of the frontier, from the mouth of the Sabine to where the Texian boundary intersects the Arkansas river inclusively; and deeming it essential to the safety of the frontier, and the fulfilment of our promises to the friendly Indians on the waters of the Arkansas and Red rivers, that the sites already recommended on those rivers should be occupied, I proceed, now, to designate the sites of the central and northwestern sections; the first of which will be the sixth site upon the frontier.

6th. The sixth site to be selected near Fort Gibson, or between that post and the mouth of the Canadian fork of the Arkansas river. (See document E.)

7th. The seventh site to be selected at or near the point where the upper road leading from Fort Gibson to Fort Leavenworth crosses the Osage river.

8th. The eighth site to be selected at or near the mouth of the Big Platte, on the right bank of the Missouri river. (Document D.)

9th. The ninth site to be selected at or near where a line drawn from the mouth of the Big Platte to the mouth of the St. Peter's crosses the Des Moines river.

10th. The tenth site to be where Fort Snelling now stands, on the right bank of the Mississippi, near the mouth of the St. Peters. (See document F.)

11th. The eleventh site to be selected near the west end of Lake Superior.

IV. Having urged the importance of immediate measures being taken for affording effective protection to the Western frontier, and more especially to the southern section; having furnished a ground-plan, with estimates of the forts and barracks which I deem essential to the security of the whole line of the frontier; and having presented my views of the military topography of the country, embracing the proposed line of posts, with the sites deemed most eligible, it remains for me to report the strength and description of force necessary for garrisoning these posts, and holding them *always ready for action*, with the means of supplying them with the munitions of war, and promptly reinforcing them in the first moments of war, or, if possible, on the first indication of a spirit of hostility on the part of the Indians, and before the tomahawk is raised against the frontier citizens.

Of the eleven forts which I have recommended, it will be recollected that the barracks of each fort are designed for the accommodation of fifteen companies of infantry, artillery, or dragoons, regulars, volunteers, or militia; during periods of peace the companies should consist of four officers and fifty non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates; the latter to be increased on the apprehended approach of war, to one hundred to each company. We shall thus have, for the peace establishment upon this frontier, eight hundred and ten officers and men at each post; making the aggregate force 8,910. This force, during a period of peace, as well as in contests with any one of two nations of Indians, will enable us to afford effective protection to any one of the principal sections of the frontier, as each post will afford a disposable force of twelve companies; three companies being amply sufficient at all times to defend any one of the posts against all the Indian warriors of the *far West*, as none of them are capable of employing ordnance in their operations against us. But, in the event of the large nations of Indians combining their united strength against us, every company should be increased to one hundred, rank and file. By this process, which should be authorized to take place the moment alliances are found to be attempted on the part of the Indians, we should have near sixteen hundred officers and men at each post; or an aggregate force upon the frontier of nearly eighteen thou-

sand, of which near sixteen thousand would be disposable.

Believing that the time is near at hand, if it has not arrived, at which every intelligent citizen of the United States will be convinced of the propriety of our abandoning the recruiting service, which brings into the army many of the vilest vagabonds, and resorting to the more rational and constitutional mode of raising an army from among the most vigorous and virtuous of the American citizens, I avail myself of this occasion to renew the proposition contained in my report of the 2d December, 1826, to recommend to Congress to provide by law for the classification and instruction of the militia of the United States, and calling into the service of the United States for one, two, or three years' service, a part, or, when necessary, the whole, of the junior class of each company, with a portion of their company officers.

Let us call to the frontier posts young men of the above description, from every county and from every captain's company in the republic, without regard to the spirit of party; let them find at each post field and staff officers highly qualified for their instruction, and, my life upon it, they will in a few months, certainly in one or two years, make as efficient company officers, and ten times better soldiers, than many of those which we have usually obtained by that most odious of all our duties, the recruiting service. By that service our army has long been infested with habitual drunkards and deserters from penitentiaries and prisons, so abandoned in their conduct and habits as often to induce officers, otherwise meritorious, to take the law into their own hands and degrade themselves and dishonor the service, by inflicting on the offending soldiery lawless punishment; tending thereby to destroy the discipline of the army, which has for its basis the known law of the republic, and introducing in its place a disgraceful species of *prison discipline*; which will, until it is suppressed, deter high-minded young men from entering the ranks of the army, where the laws designed for their protection are often disregarded. The discipline of every post and of every corps should be what it has been under our most talented officers charged with the superintendence and instruction of the United States cadets at West Point. Let this description of discipline and instruction be enforced at each one of the Western posts of my division, and we shall soon have them filled with the aspiring youth of our country, who anxiously desire to prepare themselves for defending the country, and who deem it to be as much the duty of every son of the republic to be prepared, on the approach of war, to fly to the frontier and repel the invading foe, as it is to participate in the kindred duty of governing the country.

In the hope that this proposition to convert every military post into a military academy will be attended to, I have to remark that there are several dangerous errors that have long been suffered to prevail in connexion with that academy, which I would by no means suffer to creep into the military schools of my division. Every honest, industrious, applicant, of sober, steady habits, of sound mind, and able to bear arms, should be appointed without an inquiry as to the party to which his parent or guardian may happen to belong, or even if it is found that the parent or guardian had always disdained to be the man of a party; and when the applicant arrives at the military post, or military academy, he should eat the single ration of a private soldier, until, by his meritorious conduct, he obtains a commission as an officer; and he should not be tantalized with having near him the luxuries of a hotel filled with fashionable idlers. He should perform his regular tour of duty of every description; first, as a private soldier; secondly, as a non-commissioned officer; and, when well acquainted with these duties, and a proper va-

cancy occurs, he should be allowed to perform all the duties of an officer. He should not be allowed to drink juleps, gamble, smoke segars, or chew tobacco. With the omission of these, and some other apparently trifling errors, I should be perfectly willing for my son, if I had one of the proper age, to receive his military education at one of the frontier posts here recommended; and I should hope, that when a state of war should call him to the national defence, he would be able to do good service. Sixteen is the proper age for entering the proposed military academies; never have I seen better soldiers in battle than boys of from that age to eighteen.

V. Ways and means for supplying the military posts upon the western frontier with munitions of war and troops from the interior posts, arsenals, and other places of deposit on the Mississippi, Missouri, and other navigable rivers.

Under this head will be found views which will be questioned by no man of military mind, nor by any intelligent citizen, (not blinded by the spirit of party,) upon any other ground than that of expense. Some there may be who will object to these views because they were the creation of an American brain, and neither stolen or borrowed from any European work, either ancient or modern. I recommend, with all my heart, and with all my mind, and with all my strength, the construction and employment of RAILROADS, with steam power applied to vehicles of land transportation, from the central States and interior districts, for the supply of every military post of the United States, upon the seaboard, as well as those upon the inland frontier, for the reasons which follow. (See document G.)

1. The proposed system of railroads will enable us to afford to the frontier succor, and every description of supply, in a state of war, and in peace, and at all seasons of the year, in *one-tenth of the time*, and at one-tenth part of the expense, which all the present permanent means of transportation (except by sea) will require; and, as in a war with any two or more strong naval powers, our communication by sea would frequently be occluded or interrupted, I recommend the employment of railroads for the supply of every military post in the United States, but more especially those of my division.

2. The proposed system of railroads will, by the certainty, the extraordinary rapidity and cheapness of wielding our military forces to and from the military posts that may from time to time be menaced by an invading foe, enable us, not only to afford more prompt and effective protection to the frontier, but to render a disposable army corps of twenty thousand men more terrible to an invading foe than five of such army corps (amounting to one hundred thousand men) would be in the present state of our western roads, whilst the navigation of our north-west rivers are obstructed, as they now are, with ice, and the Arkansas and Red by low water and rapids. For example: Let us have at Jefferson barracks a disposable force of ten thousand men, and at Memphis, Tennessee, (the most eligible position in the United States for assembling men and munitions of war in the shortest possible time, and at the least possible expense,) another army corps of ten thousand men, held ready at or near Memphis; let the whole western frontier be menaced by twenty thousand of the western Indian warriors, bound together by an alliance cemented by the gold and blankets of our northern neighbors; let the attack commence upon the northwestern section of the frontier; our ten thousand men at Jefferson barracks may, with the aid of railroads and steam power, be conveyed to the Upper Missouri, or Upper Des Moines, in two days' time, in high health and efficiency, with every needful supply to co-operate with the disposable forces at those points: Then let us suppose the enemy to be repulsed and dispersed, as they doubtless would be at the first meeting, in the open prairie;

let us suppose them to be moving south, towards the milder climate and woodlands of the Arkansas or Texian frontier; the army corps of Jefferson barracks would, in two days' time after the commander of that corps should receive satisfactory information of the designs of the enemy against the Arkansas frontier, arrive at this post, (Jefferson barracks,) and in two days more would find himself at Fort Gibson, with his corps ready for action, when and where he would find the army corps from Memphis, equally ready to co-operate with him, in giving protection to that section of the frontier; but should the enemy have determined to proceed farther south, with a view to break up the Sabine, and lower Red river, and Attakapas settlements, by far the most tempting points of attack, the whole of the army corps of Jefferson barracks and Memphis may be conveyed, via Little Rock and the Sabine ridge, to the Sabine section of the southern frontier, in two days. But let us suppose the enemy, in the mean time, and on the approach of warm weather, being thwarted in their purpose to lay waste the central and southern frontier, should renew their operations against the north-western section; be it so—then the whole of the ast-mentioned army corps may be placed upon the Upper Missouri, or Upper Des Moines, in from four to six days. In this way, it is obvious, that an interior disposable force of twenty thousand men, with railroads and steam-power, will render more effective service, and more complete protection to the frontier, than one hundred thousand men, stationed at this place and Memphis, could do, in the present state of the roads and rivers.

When to this view of the subject is added, that the *expense* of the transportation, in the present state of our western roads, amounts to six dollars per man for one hundred miles, and that on the railroads the expense would be but sixty cents per man for one hundred miles, (including his *arms, accoutrements, rations, and camp equipage*;) that in the present state of the roads and rivers, troops will not march more than at the rate of twenty miles per day; and that on railroads, with steam-power, they will march from one hundred and fifty to two hundred and fifty miles per day, it must be obvious that a disposable force of twenty thousand men, wielded on railroads, will render more effective service in the national defence, in time of war, than a hundred thousand men would be likely to render in the present state of the roads and rivers; and that the saving of expense will be as one to twenty in favor of railroads. The difference is as one to ten in favor of railroads, even when a force is employed equal to that which is employed without them. By this estimate, it is obvious that, by the employment of railroads during a war requiring the frequent movement of one hundred thousand men to and from several different points upon the frontier, as in the war of 1812, '13, and '14, we should *save*, in the course of such a war, in three years' time, an amount equal to the whole expense of locating and constructing all the railroads which, in my letter * of the 20th of February, 1835, I have recommended; and that, by the employment of the railroad which, in that letter, I proposed, from Louisville, (Ky.) via Nashville, to Mobile (Ala.) and Pensacola, with a branch to Tallahassee, Suwannee, and Fort Brooke, or even to Fort King, we should ere now have saved much of the reproach which the long and lingering war in Florida is likely to fix upon us, with an amount of money probably equal to the whole sum necessary for the construction of most of the railroads which I shall here recommend; provided these railroads are located and constructed principally by the troops in the service of the United States—the troops designed for the defence of this frontier—aided by some two or three hundred scientific mechanics.

* See document G.

† See document H.

3. I have now to offer the most conclusive, and, I will add, interesting and unanswerable reason in favor of the location, construction, and employment of railroads forthwith. It is, that they will, as I have shown, contribute greatly, incalculably, to the national defence during a state of war; and then, on the return of peace, when our forty millions worth of fortifications, cannon, and other ordnance and ordnance stores, are useless, and a heavy expense to the treasury of the United States to repair and replenish them, then our railroads, with steam power applied to vehicles of land transportation, may be turned to commercial purposes, in which they will yield an income sufficient to replace in the treasury, in the course of six or ten years, every dollar expended in their location and construction; and though last, not least, they will form *ligaments*, inflexible in strength and endless in duration, to render our beloved Union indissoluble and perpetual.

4. It remains for me, under this head, to designate the railroads which I deem necessary and proper to complete my project for the defence of the western frontier.

First. A railroad from Memphis (Ten.) via Little Rock (Ark.) to the Sabine river, at the point where the thirty-first degree of north latitude intersects that river or its principal fork.

Secondly. A railroad to branch off from the Tennessee and Texas railroad thirty miles northwestward from Little Rock, and to extend from the point of beginning up the valley of the Arkansas river to Fort Gibson, and thence to the site recommended where the Texas boundary intersects that river.

Thirdly. A railroad to branch off from the Tennessee and Texas railroad sixty miles to the northwestward of the point where it intersects the Red river, and to extend from the point of beginning up the valley of Red river to Fort Towson, and thence to the site recommended at the point where the Texas boundary leaves that river.

Fourthly. A railroad to branch off from the Tennessee and Texas railroad at or near the Sabine ridge, dividing the waters of Red river from those of the Sabine, and extending thence to the mouth of the Sabine river, as designated by the treaty between the United States and Mexico.

Fifthly. A railroad from the city of St. Louis to Fort Gibson, Arkansas river, with a branch to extend up one of the forks of the Merrimac river to the site recommended upon the Osage river.

Sixthly. A railroad from St. Charles to the site recommended upon the Upper Des Moines, with a branch to extend from the point at which the St. Charles and Des Moines railroad intersects the north boundary of the State of Missouri, to the Upper Missouri river, near the site recommended at the mouth of the Big Platte.

Seventhly. A railroad from the mouth of the Chippewa river to the site to be selected on Lake Superior.

VI. The proposed military posts and roads may be constructed principally by the forces recommended for the *defence of the western frontier*, aided by two or three hundred experienced scientific mechanics, with two thousand common laborers, in the course of two years. This shall be done, as I have, in my letter of the 16th November, promised, if I am furnished with the means and men, and if, indeed, I am to *COMMAND the Western division, and to direct the prosecution of the work*. But if my junior officers are *empowered* (authorized they cannot be) to thwart, and counteract, and undermine me, as some of them have been for several years past, but more especially in the last year, we may indeed (to use the expression of our acting Quartermaster General) *expend a million of money, and be engaged upon the work for five years, and then have it but half completed*. In ten years, then, according to the acting Quartermaster General's notion, we may pos-

sibly have this important frontier put in a state of defence! Permit me to assure you, General, that in ten years time the proposed cordon of posts will, for the most part, be within the immediate vicinity of a settlement as dense and as vigorous as the best settled counties of the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, or Ohio, whose statesmen will not fail to calculate upon the establishment of a cordon of posts from two to four hundred miles further in the far west.

The proposed works, therefore, if done at all, should be done quickly, as should the works proposed in my letter of the 20th of February, 1835. Until the whole of those works, but more especially the RAILROADS from the central States to the six grand divisions of the national frontier are completed, our country will not be in a state of defence. A war with England or Russia, or both, with an assailing force of two hundred thousand men, without the proposed railroads, would cost us more money in the first year of its continuance, than the whole of the railroads which I have proposed would cost.

I am aware, sir, that I am here, as I have long been, reporting views not exactly in accordance with what I understand to be the wishes of the War Department. But recollecting no good reason, military law, or order, requiring an officer to flatter that honorable functionary, or to limit an official report to views deemed to be most palatable to the War Department; and, moreover, deeming it to be as absurd and as criminal, in the present state of the arts and sciences, to propose a plan of defence for any portion of the national frontier without the application of steam-power to vehicles of land transportation on railroads, as it would be to propose a plan for navigating the Mississippi river without the application of steam-power to the boats and moving palaces which the commerce of the west now demands, I cannot, consistently with the oath which I have taken "to bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully against their enemies or opposers whomsoever," omit the foregoing views. But to return to the subject of completing the defence of the western frontier.

I propose that my command be augmented, in the manner above proposed, to ten thousand men, including 7,700 troops, 300 scientific mechanics, and 2,000 common laborers; with the requisite pay and supply of all the munitions of war for ten thousand men, together with one million of dollars per annum for contingent expenses, to be disbursed by quartermasters of my own selection, and the works to be constructed under the immediate superintendence of officers of my own selection. I will pledge my honor and my life, to have the whole of the military posts which I have recommended completed before the end of the year 1840; and that the whole of the railroads shall be completed in three years from the day of their commencement; and, moreover that when the whole of these works are completed, the officers and men employed in their construction shall be more vigorous and more highly qualified for the national defence than any of the corps now in service. All, excepting such as have seen active service in Florida, need action, not merely before an enemy, but that action which is necessary to put the nation in a state of defence, and RENDER THE NATION READY FOR ACTION.

"The life of Fame is action, understood,
That action must be virtuous, great, and good."

VII. The proposed measures for raising, moving, and instructing the requisite forces for the national defence, would, I am convinced, add from fifty to one hundred per cent. to the moral power and military prowess of the whole people of the republic; and it will not be in operation seven years before it will be so universally appreciated and approved as to render it an object of deep interest and admiration to every class of the community. Even the people

who call themselves *Friends*—who, though excellent and exemplary in most other respects, have been always opposed to war, in all its aspects, even to the most obvious means hitherto adopted for defensive war—will, I am persuaded, see in the proposed system such evidence of its tendency to lessen the evils of war, as to be induced to give it their support; and, in place of that reluctant tardiness with which they, as well as many other of the citizens of our country, have hitherto entered the service, we shall find every young man who has a spark of patriotism or chivalry, ready and willing and anxious to participate in the defence as well as in the government of the country; and those who may proudly boast of the glorious right and duties of self-government will see they have equal reason to boast of the no less glorious kindred right and duties of self-defence.

In conclusion, sir, I will repeat, as strictly applicable to the measures here proposed, my opinion, expressed in my letter of the 20th of February, 1835, in reference to my system of railroads from the central States of Kentucky and Tennessee to the six grand divisions of the national frontier, that they would contribute to render our beloved country invulnerable in war, and by means that would enrich every honest, industrious citizen in a state of peace.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

EDMUND P. GAINES,

Major General U. S. A., commanding W. Dep't.
Major General A. MACOMB,
Commanding in chief U. S. Army,
City of Washington, D. C.
[To be continued.]

CONGREVE ROCKETS.—The following is the best description we have seen of these destructive instruments, of which Great Britain is prodigal, and the fear of which broke up the camp at Navy Island.—*Buffalo Commercial Advertiser*.

"The rocket is a cylinder of hammered iron, differing nothing in shape or proportion from the paper rocket used in innocent fireworks; it is also furnished with a stick as they are, and fired in the same way. The difference and the secret, whatever it may be, is in the composition, which, though in appearance like ordinary gunpowder paste, is of so firm a consistence as to equal in hardness the iron which surrounds it. The diameter of the largest rocket hitherto used in bombardment, was eight inches; of the smallest used in field service, something less than three; in all cases the length of the cylinder is eight times its diameter. The flight of rockets, too, varies between 1,000 and 2,500 yards, in proportion to their size.

Those intended for a bombardment are usually armed with shells, containing twenty pounds of powder, and a strong iron case of combustible matter, whose violence is inextinguishable. For field service they are either armed with shell, or the top of the rocket is formed into a little mortar, which may be said to discharge at every period of its flight, from fifty to two hundred musket balls. Three field rockets may be easily carried by an infantry soldier, and they need no other apparatus for firing them, than such as may be made from six muskets and a halbert, should not a bank or wall present a more convenient stand. No rocket of more than three hundred pounds has yet been used, even for bombardments; but some years ago, Sir William Congreve, the inventor, proposed the use of rockets exceeding a ton in weight, these were to carry each several barrels of gunpowder, in a massive case of steel; wherever they struck, the impetus of their prodigious weight would force them indifferently through earth and mason work; thus heaving into the very centre of the enemy's fortifications a mine whose explosion would leave but little trace of the curtain, tower, or bastion on which it should alight."

WASHINGTON CITY ;
THURSDAY, MAY 10, 1838.

BOARD OF VISITERS, MILITARY ACADEMY.—

The following named gentlemen have been invited by the Secretary of War to attend as a Board of Visitors the annual examination of the cadets of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, to commence on the first Monday in June, 1838.

Connecticut.—Professor Thomas Hubbard.'

New York.—Gen. Ducoudray Holstein, Rev. G. M. Johnson, Professor Wm. M. Holland, James Shea, and Medad Butler, Esqrs.

Pennsylvania.—Dr. J. B. Ard, Thomas B. McElwee, John C. Plummer, and Thomas Ross, Esqrs.

Maryland.—Daniel Murray, Esq., and Professor J. T. Ducatel.

Virginia.—John E. Page, Hugh A. Garland, and Alexander Rives, Esqrs.

North Carolina.—J. F. Burgwin, Esq.

South Carolina.—Gen. George McDuffie, Professors F. Leiber, and — Holbrook.

Georgia.—C. J. McDonald, Esq.

Kentucky.—Judge James.

Tennessee.—Col. George Wilson.

Ohio.—Dr. J. D. Weston.

Mississippi.—Dr. John H. Holt.

Illinois.—B. F. Morris, Esq.

Alabama.—H. W. Ellis, Esq.

Missouri.—Col. W. H. Russell.

Arkansas.—J. S. Conway, Esq.

Michigan.—Dr. Z. Pitcher, late of U. S. army.

EXAMINATION OF MIDSHIPMEN.—A Board will be convened in Baltimore, on Monday the 28th inst., for the examination of Midshipmen whose warrants bear date prior to the 1st January, 1833, and will consist of

Commodore JAMES BIDDLE, *President.*

Commodore M. T. WOOLSEY, Captains J. J. NICHOLSON, A. CLAXTON, and J. GALLAGHER.

The Mathematical Examiners are Professors E. C. WARD and DUNCAN BRADFORD.

TRIAL OF R. E. HOOE.—After the extract from the Brunswick, Geo., Advocate had been set up, we received a copy of the Darien Telegraph, of the 24th ult., containing the evidence in detail. Although the summary from the Brunswick paper may be sufficient for the general reader, we shall probably, at some future day, when our columns are less engaged than at present, publish the trial at length.

The frigate Columbia, Commodore G. C. READ, and ship John Adams, Commander T. W. WYMAN, sailed from Hampton Roads on Sunday last, for Rio Janeiro and the East Indies.

The distinguished Seminole chief, Jumper, died at the New Orleans Barracks on the 18th ult., and was buried in the afternoon. In his coffin were placed his tobacco, pipe, rifle, and other equipments, according to his people's custom. The military, and a number of citizens, attended his funeral, which was conducted with all the honors of war.

Major General SCOTT and suite left Norfolk on Saturday, the 28th ult., in the steam packet South Carolina, and arrived at Charleston Monday night following, on their way to the Cherokee country.

ARRIVALS AT WASHINGTON.

May 4—Col. W. J. Worth, Ordnance,	Fuller's.
Ass't. Sur. J. Eaton,	Gadsby's.
Lt. Wm. Smith, Eng'r. Corps,	Fuller's.
Lt. A. C. Myers, 4th Infy.	Gadsby's.
7—Major J. A. Ashby, 2d Dragoons,	do.
8—Major N. Young, 7th Infy.	Fuller's.

LETTERS ADVERTISED.

NORFOLK, May 1.

NAVY.—Drs. George Maulsby, W. A. Green, J. A. Messersmith, E. R. Conway, W. Johnson. Pursers J. C. Holland, M. B. F. Thornton, R. R. Waldron. Capt. H. N. Page. Lieuts. T. M. Washington, G. F. Pearson, B. J. Totten, Kelty, S. C. Rowan, A. H. Kilty, R. L. Browning, H. Worthington. Mid. E. S. Hutter, D. Ammen, N. Barnes, W. L. Blanton, Geo. W. Hammersley, A. S. Baldwin, J. W. Barney, D. R. Crawford.

PASSENGERS.

SAVANNAH, April 23, per steamboat John McLean, from Garey's Ferry, Lieut. Myers and Maj. Graham, of the army.

Per U. S. steamboat Poinsett, from St. Augustine, Major H. Whiting, U. S. A.

CHARLESTON, April 27, per schr. Agnes, from St. Augustine, Lt. E. A. Capron, of the army; and left same day in steampacket Georgia, for Norfolk.

April 23, per schr. Stephen & Francis, from Indian river, via St. Augustine, Maj. J. A. Ashby, of the army.

May 1, per steampacket South Carolina, from Norfolk, Major Gen. W. Scott, Lieut. E. D. Keyes, and Dr. I. H. Baldwin, of the army.

COMMUNICATIONS.

THE NAVY.

MR. EDITOR: Your interesting number of the 12th of April contains a communication over the initials of W., in which a comparison has been drawn between the "respectability" and "efficiency" of the navy, as it existed previously to the war, during that period, and a few years succeeding it, and its present state. The picture is by no means flattering to our actual condition; but I think stricter justice would have been done to the officers of the navy, if some of the causes which have led to this unfavorable change had been given, or at least hinted at; and, as a natural consequence, the remedy could have been more distinctly traced or inferred. As, however, the impression left, after reading the observations of W. is, that we should be more likely to differ about causes than their effects, I humbly submit that the decline he describes is not only the natural, but the unavoidable, result of the mal-administration of the Navy Department for years past. Indeed, if it be not soon handed over to some one possessing enlarged and liberal views as to the objects and importance of a navy; who has some perception of the decision and energy required to administer a military department—some faint idea of military usage and propriety, and of the absolute necessity of system and discipline, I fear we shall lose all hold on the affections of the country.

The first point touched upon by W. in the scale of our degeneracy, is a falling off in that "attachment to the service, that professional pride, that esprit de corps," &c., which formerly prevailed. And is this to be wondered at, when the highest professional incentive is almost totally cut off? Is it very strange that it should be so, when men who, entering the navy with ardent zeal, and high hopes of attaining, within reasonable periods, the successive rewards of a devotion to its interests, find, after a quarter of a century, they have risen one step, and are there likely to remain? Is it surprising that an officer,

who promptly obeyed the call of his country during the last war, who fought her battles, was perhaps wounded in her defence, and who has since performed cruise upon cruise, passing successively through the duties of midshipman, master, lieutenant, and first lieutenant—who has been more years *actually at sea* than were required by some of the post captains now on the list in reaching their present grade, from the time of their entrance as midshipmen? Is it surprising, I ask, if such an officer should feel his ardor a little cooled, when he reflects he is still a lieutenant, far yet from the head of his list, with no prospect of promotion for years to come? Is it extraordinary that men so situated should occasionally speak doubtingly of a profession, in which they have failed to reach the goal of a laudable ambition—a fact which a strong attachment to that profession has kept them from realizing until too late to embark in another?

I am well aware that a radical error in our organization, originating as early as the war, and persisted in to this day, to a most ruinous extent, has mainly contributed to this state of things: the number in the higher grades, and the appointment of midshipmen never having been so regulated as to establish a proper ratio between them—a ratio that, while it would necessarily have led to more constant employment at sea while in the lower ranks, would have secured promotion within reasonable periods, and brought an officer into command while yet about the meridian of life, and after regular and consecutive experience—not with intervals of five and ten years between cruises of two and three.

It is well known the experience of command is peculiar and distinct: officers should not be left to assume for the first time its weight and responsibility until the decline of years renders them nervous and over prudent. This experience should be diffused in the navy as widely as possible. Those lieutenants, whom the breaking out of a war, or other emergency, would necessarily place immediately in command, should be promoted at once; and their turn for service would very soon come round, if the urgent demands of a wide spread and neglected commerce were regarded—demands which a liberal people, through their representatives, are ever ready to respond to; but, unfortunately, those whose duty it is to call their attention to the extent of these wants, instead of leading, or, at least, keeping pace with, public opinion in this matter, are immeasurably behind it. If, however, we cannot get more ships in commission, it were far better to so regulate the cruises of those we have, as to give an officer one turn in command, at all events, while yet in his prime. He will reap more professional advantage from such service, however short, than in treble the time served in his inferior rank. Let him once have a ship while in the zenith of his mental and physical faculties, and it may be relied upon that he will far better acquit himself, when a war will draw more heavily upon his resources.

And what does this ask for? assuming for data the force recommended by the Navy Commissioners, and which, in their opinion, "ought to be prepared ready for use;" which recommendation has been quoted and approved by the Secretary of War, in a report to the Senate in January last, on the protection of our eastern boundary. It would promote a body of officers who entered the service of their country before and during the last war, and who have served from twenty-three to twenty-six years as midshipmen and lieutenants. Such a measure would add greatly to the professional and moral efficiency of the navy, and conduce more to the restoration of that *esprit de corps*, the loss of which W. so greatly laments, than all the essays on the subject that could be crammed into a quarto volume. It is true, no signed or sealed contract was entered into, that officers should be promoted in any fixed period;

but there is a moral obligation on the part of the Government to act in this matter as far as circumstances will admit. It would give a healthy tone to an honorable class of public servants, which cannot but redound to the positive benefit of the country, through one of its most cherished interests. If any thing were wanting to prove the unshaken devotion of the immediate representatives of the nation to objects naval and commercial, it would be sufficient to point to the manner in which they have been reconciled to the enormous expenses of that budget of blunders, the Exploring Expedition. As for the Senate, liberal and generous, it is ever ready to co-operate in this work; but it belongs to the Executive, through his nominations, to ask for this co-operation.

The substance of the next complaint by W., alluding more particularly, as, indeed, he seems to do throughout, to the officers of the lower grades, is the indifference manifested by them to service at sea; the manner in which they receive and obey orders; the futile excuses in declining them, &c. And, pray, whose fault is this? If the Navy Department in practice renders its orders optional, is it not in human nature to avail itself of this freedom? Does W. believe that if the captain of a man of war were to resolve no longer to exact obedience to his orders and regulations, but leave every thing to the moral sense of propriety of his officers and crew, that the discipline of his ship, however perfect it might have been, would not immediately decline, and end in disorder, if not something worse?

If there is any branch of the Navy Department more noted than another for a total want of system, it is the process of officering ships. No regard is had to seniority, sea service, or relative fitness in any way. No idea seems to prevail of the importance and advantage of requiring from every officer a certain amount of active service—in different classes of ships—on different stations—of enabling as many as practicable to perform, in due time, the duties of first lieutenant, &c. We see at one time a captain choosing this officer indiscriminately—at another he is restricted to certain parts of the list—at a third, four or five names are handed him to select from—and anon the selection of nearly all his officers is yielded to him. Again, when some six lieutenants are required for a ship, a dozen are ordered from those most contiguous to the place of fitting out, under the expectation that this will secure the requisite number. Knowing this, unless particularly disposed for a cruise, two-thirds of them decline, each one depending upon the acceptance of his neighbor to make up the proper quota. Another batch have thus to be ordered, or the ship sails without her complement; or, perhaps ready and waiting for more officers, some poor devil just from a cruise is seized upon, without time allowed him to demur, though, in all probability, the only one of the whole set who had a decent excuse to offer. Then, again, all those ordered take it into their heads to go, and the ship sails, as in the case of the Independence, with several over her complement. When a frigate was commissioned some two years since, the Department addressed two officers, offering them the first lieutenantcy, on the supposition, I presume, that one or the other would necessarily decline; but both accepted, prepared their outfits, and waited daily for their orders. Of course, in due time, one of them discovered that he was not the man. Officers are permitted to return from foreign stations, for which there may be good reasons other than ill health, but they should always be replaced. The West India squadron, with its head quarters within mail facilities, has been most cruelly neglected in this particular; the service in the sloops has been exceedingly arduous, and that in a most trying climate. Yet these ships, for the last two years, have scarcely had, at any one time, more than half their complement of officers.

It seems incredible, but it is generally believed, that the saving of travelling expenses has been frequently the basis of official action in relation to this subject. Regard is had to the distance of the ship or station to be supplied! In a pecuniary point of view, the Department seems to forget, that the acting appointments caused by these deficiencies draw more money from the treasury than would cover thrice over all the travelling expenses thus incurred.

Formerly, W. informs us, an officer was pleased to be employed unconditionally; now, he says, "it sometimes occurs that a midshipman is not willing to go to sea, unless as a lieutenant; a lieutenant unless as first lieutenant of a frigate or line of battle ship; another unless in command. These objections are frequently founded on no better grounds than that there is one, whose name stands lower on the register than their own, commanding, or first lieutenant, or acting lieutenant in some remote sea; where, being present, the fortunate junior perhaps succeeds to a vacancy occasioned by death, retirement from ill health, or other causes productive of change on the station. Formerly this was not the case; nor do I believe such reasons for declining service would have availed." It would have been, I think, more correct to say, that formerly the Navy Department did not involve itself in such inconsistencies, as to be compelled, in a measure, to listen to such objections. For instance, we have seen a commodore, before sailing from the country, have officers removed from his ship, and so arrange the relative rank of the others, as to carry out plans for his entire command on reaching a foreign station. That is, A and B are relieved, because they interfere with C, whom he desires to appoint captain of his ship upon the transfer of his first lieutenant to the command of a schooner, whose officers are to return to the United States; and a second vessel of this class, being retained on the station, gives a command to another of his lieutenants. Now, would W. think it very strange if A and B, who were removed that this arrangement could be effected, should demur a little at being sent as second or third lieutenants of a schooner or sloop to join this squadron, and among other things to be called upon to render all due honors to these young captains, excellent and worthy officers, but some of whom were not in the service while they and many others who witnessed these arrangements were cruising during the war? Be it observed, too, that this very ship, instead of taking out a senior lieutenant to command the schooner, as had always been the custom, sailed with her own complement greatly below the existing allowance. To show a still greater inconsistency, the same commodore, when he expected to hoist his flag in a frigate, applied for a certain officer to be his first lieutenant; this was promptly refused, on the score that the officer was too low on the list; the present first lieutenant or acting commander of his line of battle ship, with every other lieutenant, save one, in his fleet, are lower on the list than the one so refused.

Now, this was no case of a fortunate junior succeeding to a death vacancy, or retirement from ill health; but the result of an arrangement matured in this country, with the co-operation of the Navy Department, and consummated some three or four months from the commencement of a three years' cruise; and again recognised by the Department in refusing to order out senior officers to these vessels. It is not pretended here that in officering every ship and station, a very strict regard can be paid to the relative position of each officer on the list; though a system could easily be devised which would bring about a great approximation to it. All that is complained of, is a departure from all military usage and propriety—a disregard of the claims of seniority and long service—in short, the absence of system or consistency; the rule of to-day being no guide what-

ever to that which may prevail to-morrow. It is to be hoped that this sensibility to rank and seniority will continue to be cherished and guarded by every officer as the apple of his eye. It has been currently reported, in the course of the Protean shapes assumed by that naval blotch, the Exploring Expedition, that an officer has *volunteered* to serve under the immediate command of his junior; but it is hoped this is a mistake. However chilling to many a gallant bosom the implied inferiority conveyed by the principal appointment to this expedition, it is of far more serious consequence that an officer should take this occasion to depart from the invariable practice of the service. It is setting a dangerous precedent, which may be used hereafter to the vital injury of the navy—what he has *volunteered* to perform, may be *exact*ed from another.

The want of respect evinced by inferiors to their superiors, is the subject of W.'s next comment; the free tone in which their acts are scanned and criticised, how "the title is dropped and the surname substituted," and "the little discipline and less good breeding where such manners prevail." This is truly a lamentable portrait; but I trust it is overdrawn, or whatever of it exists now, has done so more or less at all times, in all corps, and in all countries. Young men *will* know better than their elders; and professional critics can only go for what they are worth, being often bold and severe in the inverse ratio of their age and experience—those in the steerage having always been the loudest. As to dropping the title, W. surely does not forget the war *sobriquets* applied to some of our most worthy veterans, such as "Black Jack," "Old Snuffy," and a host of others now almost obsolete, and in this respect showing some improvement.

We are further told by W., that a "spirit of detraction" has found its way into the service, and "to the malevolence of its shafts all have been alike exposed." If this be so, it is very wrong, and much to be regretted; but I cannot think such a feeling general in the navy. It is sincerely hoped and believed that a proper sense of respect is entertained for the mass of their superiors by the junior officers; between many of them, strong personal regard is known to exist. Candor, however, compels the admission that there is some exception in the case of the Navy Commissioners. These gentlemen, though highly respected as individual officers, seem in their joint official capacity to have the whole navy against them. Always unpopular, this feeling appears to have acquired great intensity within a few years, and the Board cannot now be mentioned without eliciting remarks of severe and bitter reproach. Nor is this confined by any means to the junior officers, many of the higher grades bearing a conspicuous part in it. Be it correct or not, the opinion prevails generally in the navy, that its efficiency would be greatly promoted by a different organization of that Board. Most of the junior officers have also imbibed the idea that its influence, known to be great in all naval legislation, has never been exerted to improve their condition. All, high and low, seem to agree as to its almost entire irresponsibility. For example: the Board stands now charged before Congress with having been eighteen months fitting out a ship, which it had reported could be ready in four. Suppose the neglect involved in this charge be true, it falls on no one in particular. But if the multifarious duties of that office were classed, with separate and responsible heads for each, and the delay were traced to the department of construction, rigging, or armament, or provisions, &c., a particular door could be knocked at; and an officer would feel a very different sense of accountability, when liable to be held up by name, or as head of a bureau, to answer for neglect or mal-administration.

These remarks have extended much farther than was contemplated; but the degeneracy of the ser-

vice being now a common theme, it was thought but fair to offer what were conscientiously believed to be some of the leading causes of the alleged decline.

In conclusion, I agree most heartily with W. that the deeds of the gallant men who led our ships to renown and to victory, "should be treasured up as a rich legacy." The whole navy owes them a heavy debt of gratitude for fixing it firmly in the affections and policy of the country, as one of its most prized institutions. But it is hoped that the noble spirit which animated these brave men, has been freely imparted to others; that, at the worst, it only lies dormant, waiting for the first exigency to break forth in renewed vigor, under the strong incentive of emulating past exploits, and of meeting high wrought expectations. A gleam of this spirit shone forth, when the report of an aggression on our coast reached us—all grades rushing instantaneously on board of surveying brigs, revenue cutters, and pilot boats, the only available force, in a navy on which a liberal nation has expended seventy millions of dollars since the termination of the last war.

X.

THE LATE LIEUT. COL. JOHN FOWLE.

MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT, }
May 3, 1838. }

The following resolutions were unanimously adopted by the Corps of Cadets, at a meeting held by them upon receiving information of the death of Lieut. Col. JOHN FOWLE, of the 6th Regiment U. S. Infantry, which was caused by the explosion of the boilers of a steamboat on the Ohio river, near Cincinnati, on the 25th of April:

Resolved, That the Corps of Cadets has heard with feelings of the utmost regret of the death of Lieut. Col. JOHN FOWLE, of the 6th Infantry, its late commandant.

Resolved, That, by his untimely fate, the army has been deprived of one of its most estimable members, and the nation of one of its ablest tacticians and most efficient officers.

Resolved, That we feel most sensibly his loss, on account of the intimate connexion which has lately subsisted between us and the deceased; a connexion uniformly marked on his part by urbanity, kindness, and the most gentlemanly demeanor; and that we will long cherish his memory with grateful recollections.

Resolved, That in testimony of our grief, and as a mark of respect, we will wear the usual badge of mourning for thirty days.

Resolved, That a committee of one from each class be appointed to transmit to the family of the deceased a copy of the above resolutions, and to write to them a letter of condolence, expressive of our heartfelt sympathy in their misfortune.

Resolved, That the Secretary of the meeting be directed to transmit to the editors of the "Army and Navy Chronicle," the "Alexandria Gazette," and of the Boston papers generally, a copy of the above resolutions for publication.

S. H. CAMPBELL, *Chairman*.

JOHN C. FLETCHER, *Secretary*.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE.

FLORIDA WAR.

ST. AUGUSTINE, April 14.—Lieut. Linnard, aid to Gen. Jesup, arrived in this city in the U. States steamer Poinsett, on Wednesday last, and departed the same day, via Picolata, for Tampa.

Gen. Jesup has gone to Tampa.

Preparations are making for the troops to return into summer quarters. The steamers John McLean, Santee, and Camden arrived here yesterday, on their way south, to withdraw troops and provisions.

A letter from the Post Master at Tampa, Florida,

to the Post Master General, dated Feb. 13, says: "The mail which left here on Tuesday, the 3d inst., is lost. The carrier was brutally murdered about sixteen miles this side of Fort King. He was shot from his horse by Indians, his scalp taken off, his eyes dug out, his ears and nose cut off, and other horrid atrocities and torments inflicted upon him. The horse and mail bags have not since been found."

We understand reports have been received at the War Department, stating that Alligator, one of the most active and warlike of the hostiles, had surrendered at Fort Bassinger on the 4th of April. He was found, with 88 of his people, among whom was John Cowaya, and 27 blacks, to the southwest of Okeechobee. Alligator was to return to his party, and, by means of runners, collect all the scattered Indians, and concentrate them at Pease creek. It is confidently expected that Coacoochee, with a small party, can be prevailed on by Alligator to come in also.

In addition to the above it is also learned that 45 Indians, 17 of whom are warriors, were recently captured by a detachment of regular troops and Tennessee volunteers, under Lieutenant R. Anderson, 3d Artillery, and are now at Fort Lauderdale. Gen. Jesup, at the last advices, (18th April,) was at Tampa Bay.—*Globe*.

THE OSAGE CAMPAIGN.—From Lieut. Bowman, who arrived yesterday morning from Fort Leavenworth, in the steamer Dart, we learn that the Osage disturbance has been peaceably and entirely quelled. They were astonished at the celerity with which our troops had been brought upon them, and such was their idea of the advance of the three mounted companies in columns over the prairie, with their baggage wagons, that they estimated the number at some thousands, and declared that the "whole prairie was full of guns." Col. Kearny held a council with several hundreds of them, among whom were all their principal men of the tribe. They were severally "talked to," and were very much frightened, declared that the depredations and outrages upon the whites had been the work of only a few bad men. Several Indians, who were proved guilty, were delivered up to the Council, by whom, in presence of Col. Kearny, they were severely punished. They promised never again to infringe upon the rights of the borderers, and it is believed they will maintain the promise; but their condition is represented to be a half starved, wretched one, and it is impossible to say to what necessity may not compel them.—*St. Louis Commercial Bulletin*.

ARMY MOVEMENTS.—A detachment of one hundred and fifty United States recruits, destined to reinforce the regiments ordered to the Cherokee Nation, embarked for Charleston on the morning of the 3d instant, on board the ship John Cumming, George Thayer, master.

Officers attached to the command: Capt. Gouverneur Morris, 4th infantry, commanding; 1st Lieut. C. H. Larned, 4th infantry, A. Quartermaster.—*New York American*.

COLUMBUS, GEO., April 26.—We learn that the U. S. troops who have been ordered from Florida, will pass through this place, on their way to the Cherokee country, about the 10th of May next. Large quantities of provisions and ammunition will also be forwarded by the same route. The paymaster, Major Heintzelman, requests us to state, that on or before the middle of May, he will purchase or hire from sixty to an hundred teams. Here is another chance for our citizens to make a grab at Uncle Sam's crib.

Speaking of wagons and teams employed in the public service, an officer of the army told us the other day, that in connexion with the Florida service, he had examined an account against Government, in which a wagon and six horses were valued at twenty-

five hundred dollars, and the average value of a regiment of horses was set down at two hundred dollars a head! It was our misfortune to see the horses last named, and forty dollars in *suspension* notes was the highest we would have given for the best nag in the crowd.—*Sentinel and Herald*.

From the Portland, Me., Advertiser.
THE LATE CAPT. THOMAS M. SHAW,
OF THE U. S. REVENUE SERVICE.

CASCO BAY, (MAINE,) }
April 20, 1838. }

At a meeting of the officers of the U. S. Revenue Service, on the Portland and Eastport stations, held on board the U. S. Cutter Crawford, Capt. Uriah Coolidge was appointed chairman, and Capt. Ezekiel Jones Secretary. Whereupon it was

Resolved, The members of this meeting have received, with the deepest regret, the intelligence of the death of Captain Thomas M. Shaw, of the U. S. Revenue service. His long and faithful services are well known and duly appreciated, and the goodness of his heart will never be forgotten by a grateful public, more especially those who have sailed under his command.

Resolved, That, in token of our regret for his death, the members of this meeting wear crape on the left arm for thirty days.

Resolved, That a copy of the proceedings of this meeting be forwarded to the family of the deceased, as an expression of the deep sympathy of the officers attached to the above mentioned stations, in the loss they have sustained.

Resolved, That as a further mark of our respect for the high official and moral character of the deceased, we recommend to the commanding officers of all the U. S. Cutters to cause their colors to be hoisted half mast, and to fire the usual number of minute guns, upon receiving intelligence of this lamentable event.

URIAH COOLIDGE, *Captain*.
EZEKIEL JONES, *Captain*.
GREEN WALDEN, *1st Lieut*.
JOHN WHITCOMB, *1st Lieut*.
JOSEPH A. NOYES, *2d Lieut*.
JAMES H. ROACH, *2d Lieut*.
ARNOLD BURROUGH, *3d Lieut*.
SAM'L. T. WILLIAMS, *3d Lieut*.

We learn with sincere regret that Lieut. Commandant STURGIS, of the U. S. Revenue Cutter McLane, at this port, has received instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury, in pursuance of which he is in a few days to be transferred to a command on board the Cutter Hamilton, at Boston. Captain CURRIER is to succeed to the command of the McLane on this station.

Lieut. Sturgis, during the five years past in which he has been employed as an officer in the revenue service on this station, has entitled himself to the confidence and esteem of the mercantile community and of the citizens generally, by the faithful and assiduous discharge of his public duties, no less than by a general courtesy of demeanor, and by numerous acts of benevolence and philanthropy, which will long be held in grateful remembrance in this place. Especially by all who have been interested in the promotion of the objects of the "Seamen's Friend Society," in which cause he has rendered invaluable services, such remembrance will be associated with the best emotions due to its most distinguished benefactors. We are fully warranted in saying that the best wishes of every good citizen will attend him in his future career, wherever he may be called.—*New Bedford Mercury*.

The following complimentary card, addressed to Lieut. Comd't STURGIS, of the U. S. Revenue Cutter McLane, is published at the request of the persons whose signatures are subjoined thereto.

U. S. REVENUE CUTTER M'LANE, }
May 1, 1838. }

MR. STURGIS,—Sir: It is with mingled feelings of

pleasure and regret that we now address you—of pleasure, that you are about to have your wishes gratified in being removed to a situation, where you will be placed in the midst of your relatives and friends—and of regret, that we are to be deprived of the counsel and advice of one who is, and may be truly styled, the "Sailor's Friend;" and it is our wish, sir, that you will look over and forgive any imperfections you may have seen in us, and attribute it to our frailty, and not to our bad intentions. And we humbly beg of you, sir, to accept of our sincere thanks and gratitude for the many favors you have so kindly conferred on us during the time we have been under your command. In conclusion, accept of the heartfelt wishes of the McLane's crew for your uninterrupted happiness. That your path may be strewn with roses unmixed with thorns—that your journey through life may be musically sweet, without even one cloud to dim your horizon, or darken your bright prospects of a futurity, is, and ever will be, the sincere wish of your humble servants,

William Brodhead,	Benjamin H. Sprague,	
John Butcher,	Riley Thayer,	
John Grattan,	John C. Barker,	
Charles S. Clark,	Cyrus Blanchard,	
William Bailey,	John Brown,	
Nathaniel Gardner,	Isaac	(X) their marks
Austin H. Perkins,	Stephen	(X) } Spear,
Caleb Rouse,	Ottaway	(X) } Burroughs,
George E. Boyer,	Stephen	(X) } Jackson,
Calvin Follet,	James	(X) } Burke,
		(X) } Hyate,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, }
Washington, April 25, 1838. }

The following Notice to Mariners has been received at this Department from Charles J. Hambro, Esq., Consul of the United States at Copenhagen:

NOTICE TO MARINERS.

To render more secure the navigation of the difficult channel of "Drogden," between the islands of Amack and Saltholm, at the entrance of the Baltic Sea, and more especially to serve as a guide to ships making for that passage, there will, at the close of this month, in pursuance of his Majesty's commands, be stationed a floating light and pilot vessel in a southwesterly direction from "Guartus Shoal, near Drago."

This vessel, which has two masts, of a peculiar schooner rig, and of which the sides are painted red, with a white cross, will be stationed about 400 fathoms to the southwest of "Guartus" shoal, in 4½ fathoms water, bearing, per compass, S. ½ E. three-eighths of a Danish mile from Drago harbor, and E. S. E. three-sixteenths of a mile from the "Sandrew" buoy.

The light will consist of nine lamps with reflectors, which will be hung round the mainmast, and will be hoisted at the height of 25 Danish feet above the surface of the water.

Like other Danish lights, this light will, between Michaelmas and Easter, be kept burning from half an hour after sunset, and between Easter and Michaelmas from one hour after sunset, to sunrise.

In rainy and foggy weather this vessel's bell will be rung for 10 minutes at a time, after intervals of 5 minutes duration. During the day time a red flag will be kept flying at the foretop, and in stormy weather a red jack will be hoisted at the same top.

This vessel will always have on board several Drago pilots, in order that, on all occasions, and especially in southerly winds, they may be able the sooner to meet vessels coming from the Baltic, and pilot them through "Drogden," which vessels must make the usual signal for a pilot. For the protection of ship-owners and underwriters, there will be inserted, once a week, in the newspaper called "Handels og Industrie Tidende," an official list of such ships com-

ing from the south, as have employed pilots through Drogden.

It is intended that the said floating light and pilot vessel shall remain on the station until the 21st December, and be again put out on the 1st of March, every year, unless hindered by the ice.

With the exception of putting pilots on board, it is not allowed the crew to have intercourse with any passing ship or vessel, excepting only in case of distress, where immediate help may be wanted, which, in such cases, will, as far as possible, be instantly afforded.

At Copenhagen, in the general Board of Customs and Trade, October 10, 1837.

From the Charleston Courier.

JENKS' PATENT RIFLE.—A Patent Rifle, on an improved construction, has been recently invented by Mr. WILLIAM JENKS, of Columbia, S. C., one of which, as a specimen, for the examination of such persons as may call, will be exhibited this day, at the Reading Room, between 10 and 12 o'clock, A. M.

The following documents will show the opinion of competent judges as to its usefulness.

Mr. JENKS' newly invented rifle, for loading at the breech, has been submitted to, and examined by me. I am of the opinion it is the best of the kind, comprising some of the most important requisites of such instruments, simplicity, celerity, safety, and accuracy. With a view of giving it a *practical test*, I ordered a committee to examine and fire it. Their report is appended.

PIERCE M. BUTLER.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, COLUMBIA,
April 20, 1838.

STATE ARSENAL, Columbia, April 16, 1838.
His Excellency P. M. BUTLER:

In obedience to your order of the 9th instant, the Committee appointed to examine and report on the gun, recently invented by Mr. WM. JENKS, make the following report:

After a full experiment and careful examination, the Committee unanimously concur in the opinion that the invention will be found of the greatest utility, both in war and peace, being safe and simple in the construction, and much more easily and frequently charged in the same space of time than an ordinary firelock, and equally handy and convenient for ordinary militia duty. In our opinion the invention will admit of improvement, nevertheless all the essential advantages arising from it are strikingly set forth.

M. C. SHAFFER,
JOHN VEAL,
J. H. CRAWFORD,
E. FRIDAY.

RED RIVER RAFT.

Extracts from letters of Capt. Shreve.

HEAD OF THE RED RIVER RAFT, }
March 27, 1838. }

Brig. Gen. CHARLES GRATIOT,

Chief Engineer, Washington:

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that the Red river Raft is now removed, and a free navigation opened for steamboats, four of which have passed up through it.

The steamer Revenue came up yesterday with a full freight, in twelve hours through the upper section of the Raft. The navigation is now better from Shreveport to the head of the Raft than it is below that place.

The Willow Chute, one of the most formidable outlets from the main channel on the east side, has been filled from the Raft with a dense mass of timber, four and a half miles from the old river. The effect has been favorable to the fullest extent of my most sanguine calculations; it has stopped out of that chute three-fourths of the water that flowed through it two

months ago, and it is now in a situation to collect a deposit of mud that will accumulate very fast, and finally dry that pass.

I have in progress, an embankment of earth over Benevare Bayou, but have some doubt of being able to close it against the quantity of water that flows out of that channel; if, however, I succeed, the bayou will be dried. I have already been successful in closing three bayous of smaller dimensions with similar works. The embankments are made of earth, the base three times the height, and twelve feet at top; they serve as bridges, and form a good roadway.

The slopes of the embankments are planted with willow, and thatched with cane, to preserve them from the wash by rains.

The embankments are raised three feet above the land, and levees have been thrown up to prevent the freshets of the river from washing them. I have hopes of their durability, as their usefulness is of the greatest importance to the success of the improvement of the navigation of the river.

I am also erecting a boom of floating trees, scarfed together, at Duley's Bayou, eight miles above the Raft, designed to throw the drifting timber into that bayou, which has sufficient capacity to take in all the timber that will probably come down the river in two years. If the boom proves effectual, two very important objects will be gained by it. First, the timber will be thrown out of the Raft region, and will not obstruct the navigation. Secondly, the bayou will be filled up, and a large portion of its water, that now flows into Lake Caddo, will be turned into the river, and flow through the Raft region.

I shall continue to make all the improvements that can be made by stopping up the bayous, removing fragments of the Raft left on shoal points, and snags and logs from the bed of the river, and felling trees at places where the banks are caving in, until the first of May; at that time the engagement of the men now employed expires.

I shall proceed to Louisville, Kentucky, with the men and boats.

U. S. STEAMER ERADICATOR, }
RED RIVER RAFT, April 1, 1838. }

By my letter to the Department, dated the 27th ultimo, you were informed that the Red river Raft was cut through. In confirmation of that fact, I have to inform you that steam, keel, and flat-bottomed boats now navigate it daily, without difficulty.

Seven steamboats, four keel-boats, and one flat-boat, have passed, (the Government boats not included.) I left Shreveport on the 29th ultimo, with the United States Steamer Pearl, at 9 A. M., and ran out at the head of the Raft, (distance fifty-two miles,) at ten minutes before 5, P. M.; the average speed on the trip, was over six and a half miles an hour.

On the 31st ultimo, the steamer Brian Boroihme made the run, with a full cargo, in 7 hours 30 minutes.

I name these facts to show to the Department that no obstructions of consequence can remain in that part of the river, or such speed could not be carried through the whole trip.

That part of the Raft, which was located below Shreveport, has been successfully navigated for three years past; its distance 115 miles.

I hope Congress will make an appropriation at their present session, sufficiently large to admit of the Eradicator returning to this river at as early a date in the fall as she can get up. It will be necessary to enlarge its channel at the most contracted points, to give room for the drifting trees to pass down without lodging. When the river has its greatest freshets, a large quantity of timber flows down, and must form new rafts, if the trees are not cut short, and passed down, until the river is cleared to such a width as to take them down whole.

I am, sir, very respectfully, &c. &c.

HENRY M. SHREVE,
Superintendent, &c

GENERAL WOOL.

From the Plattsburgh, N. Y., Republican.

We take great pleasure in laying before our readers the following correspondence with Gen. Wool, furnished us for publication by the committee. In view of the malignant attempts of certain individuals to degrade and injure a brave and capable officer, we are happy, not only in promulgating the expression of approbation by a large portion of the most respectable citizens of this county, but in laying before the public his appropriate acknowledgment and reply:

PLATTSBURGH, April 11, 1838.

To Brig. Gen. JOHN E. WOOL, U. S. Army.

SIR: Your presence on this frontier has, in a particular manner, called to the recollection of our citizens the part you bore in the late war, and especially in the defence of this section of the country.

The invasion of Plattsburgh, in 1814, was one of the most important events of that war; on no other occasion, during that contest, was our country invaded with so large a force. A well appointed army of 14 or 15,000 troops, under the immediate direction of the Commander-in-chief, and the Governor of the Canadas, aided by officers of great military skill and experience, was met and repulsed by a force on our part of 1,500 regular troops, aided by the brave and enthusiastic militia, and the combined victory by land and water formed one of the most brilliant achievements of the late war; and added greatly to the honor of our country and its arms. On that occasion you were associated with Macomb, Macdonough, and Mooers, and with our gallant army, navy, and militia, with the brave and patriotic citizens of this state, and the no less brave and patriotic citizens of Vermont, in meeting and repelling the invaders.

It is a matter of history, and is personally known to many of our citizens, that you took an active part in the contest produced by that invasion, and that your duty on that occasion was performed with distinguished gallantry and good conduct.

The recent disturbances on this frontier have formed an occurrence of much interest and importance to our country and its citizens. The good faith of the nation and its own laws and treaties were to be maintained and preserved. The great evils of a border warfare, which, if commenced, would inevitably lead to much suffering, bloodshed and calamity, and probably in the end involve us in a war, were to be prevented. In the highly excited state of the public mind, the performance of these duties must necessarily be a matter of much delicacy and difficulty, and it was not to be expected but that in such a state of public feeling, misrepresentation would be sure to prevail, which might, for a time, produce unfavorable impressions, and dissatisfaction on the part of a portion of the community, in regard to the conduct of any officer who should faithfully execute so important a trust.

The execution of this trust was confided to you by the Government of our country, and you were directed, and in duty and honor bound, to endeavor faithfully to carry its orders and wishes into effect.

The execution of those duties has been of the most trying, arduous, and delicate nature, involving great responsibility, and amidst the many difficulties and embarrassments, by which you were surrounded, required the exercise of a high moral courage and firmness. That your conduct has met with the approbation of the Government, and of the citizens of the United States generally, it affords us pleasure to believe.

That the majesty and supremacy of the laws must be asserted and preserved; that the national faith and honor must be maintained in the observance of its treaties; and that the violation of either (under any pretence however specious) cannot be tolerated, are cardinal doctrines in the creed of every true American patriot. A number of our fellow citizens, enter-

taining these opinions, have directed us, as their committee, to express their respect for your character and their approbation of your conduct on the occasions above referred to, and to invite you to partake of a public dinner.

It affords the undersigned much pleasure to carry into effect the instructions thus received, and in obedience thereto, they ask your acceptance of a public dinner, to be given at this place on such a day as may suit your convenience.

The undersigned beg leave to add their entire concurrence in the opinions and feelings of the citizens, by whom they have been deputed as above expressed.

With our best wishes for your happiness, and prosperity, we are, sir, with much respect and esteem,

Your ob't servants.

WM. F. HAILE,

A. C. MOORE,

RICHARD YATES,

ST. JOHN B. L. SKINNER,

WM. SWEETLAND,

ISAAC C. PLATT,

L. MYERS,

Committee, &c.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PLATTSBURGH, N. Y., }
April 12, 1838. }

GENTLEMEN: I had the honor to receive your communication of yesterday, tendering me, in behalf of yourselves and others of my fellow citizens, a public dinner, as a mark of respect for services I have rendered my country at different periods on the frontier. This distinguished mark of your approbation, as well as those who are united with you in conferring it, of my conduct in 1814, and during the past winter, has filled me with the deepest sense of gratitude. In the performance of the responsible duties imposed on me in the cases referred to, I can truly say, I was governed by no other considerations than the maintenance of the honor, the interest, and welfare of our common country. Although the scenes recently enacted on this frontier were of a different character from those of 1814, yet they were not less important, as they involved the peace and welfare of the Union. They presented the sad spectacle of foreigners coming amongst us, and in violation of the laws, and in opposition to the constituted authorities of the country, raising, with impunity, an army for the purpose of levying war upon a nation with whom we were at peace, and with whose Government we were on terms of amity and friendship. With like impunity we have seen individuals of this army doing violence to the property of our most worthy citizens, breaking open arsenals, and plundering the State of its arms, and trampling under foot the very laws and institutions they profess so much to admire, and which they say they would impose on a neighboring people. To check this mad and lawless career, and to preserve the laws, the peace, the honor, and the interests of the country, it became my duty, as Military Commander on this frontier, to arrest this army and its leaders.

It is true, as you have justly observed, this was not accomplished without producing embarrassment, excitement, misrepresentation, unfavorable impressions, and dissatisfaction. That the leaders of this expedition against Canada should have sought for causes to justify their lawless and unwarrantable acts, was to have been expected; but that citizens of the United States should have so far forgotten the respect and obligations due to their own government, and their own institutions, as to encourage foreigners to wholly disregard the one, and trample under foot the other, was as unexpected as it was extraordinary, and bespeaks an indifference to their own happy form of government, which, if persisted in, must endanger its peace and harmony.

It would afford me the highest gratification to meet you and my fellow citizens at the festive board; but as an excitement still prevails on the St. Lawrence frontier, as well as that of Vermont, and in other parts of the country within my command, in relation to the

cause of the Canadians, I am unable to say at what moment I may be called from this part of the country. I am therefore under the necessity of declining the invitation so flatteringly tendered to me, with the assurance that your approval, and that of my fellow citizens in general, of my conduct in discharge of the duties to which you have alluded, is regarded as the highest reward which can be conferred upon the patriot and the soldier.

With considerations of the highest respect,
I have the honor to be,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,
Brig. Gen. U. S. Army.

To Messrs. Wm. Sweetland, Isaac C. Platt, St. John
B. L. Skinner, L. Myers, Wm. F. Haile, A. C.
Moore, Richard Yates, Committee, &c.

From the Cleveland Herald, March 7.

INCIDENT IN THE BATTLE OF CHIPPEWA.—While General Scott was in town, yesterday, several of our citizens called to pay their respects to him, among others Mr. H. one of our most estimable citizens, who had known General Scott in the war of 1812. General Scott, in introducing Mr. H. to his aids, referred to an incident in the Battle of Chippewa, in the engagement of the 5th of July, 1814. General Scott said he saw three drummer boys who were near the troops and exposed to the fire of the enemy. He directed them to go back where they would be out of danger. The boys retired; two of their drums had been spoiled by shot, and the three boys were disputing about the possession of the third drum which was whole, when two of them were killed by a cannon ball which took off the heads of both. General Scott said that one of the most affecting sights he ever beheld, was the surviving boy gazing at the bodies of his two companions; it was a spectacle which made him weep. The boys were all about 15 years of age. The survivor was (we presume there is no indelicacy in mentioning the name,) Mr. Jarvis F. Hanks, of this city—who, in reference to this incident, may say with the Roman poet, or in a more devout scene.
'Sic me servavit Apollo—'

SOLID CONSTRUCTION OF SHIPS' BOTTOMS.—The following communication, copied from the London Nautical Magazine, for April, shows, in a striking manner, the advantages of filling in, solid, the frames of ships. The packet Ranger, alluded to, was thrown upon the rocks at or near Falmouth, England, during one of the violent gales in February.—*N. Y. Journal of Commerce.*

I have just come from H. M. packet Ranger. What a beautiful proof she is of the perfection of the present method of ship-building pursued in the navy! She has been lying there during all this bad weather, with the sea breaking over her every high water, and with such violence that it has sent her bodily up, I should say twelve or fifteen feet, till she could go no further, the rocks on her lee-side forming a perfect wall, against which she is shored and choaked up to the walls; and notwithstanding all this, I cannot see an alteration in her sheer or form, in any way, nor do I believe there is a timber of her broken. Mr. Lang ought to come down to see the great perfection of his garboard strake, &c.; the destruction of the keel, deadwood, &c., in the case of the Pique, was nothing to it. The keel of her stern-post is split to pieces, and the whole of her deadwood aft, for perhaps ten feet, twisted, and altogether out of a line with her keel very considerably, and further forward a little. Such destruction made with keel and garboard strake as I should think was never before seen. Notwithstanding all this, I have no doubt, could she be got off the rocks, that she would swim, and could be taken around to Plymouth. A thousandth part of the injury thus described would

have destroyed the best ship that ever was built before the introduction of solid bottoms and frames, and Mr. Lang's improvements added thereto. No other description of ship whatever but must have been destroyed the very tide she got on shore. The Ranger lays at this moment substantially, I really believe, unhurt; a specimen, of which our naval architects might be proud, and the proof of the stupidity and downright insanity of the merchant ship-builders of the present day, who will shut their eyes to the almost absolute perfection adopted in constructing our men of war.

I wish Mr. Ballingal could see her; it would repay him for the pains he has taken in that good cause,—the advocacy of solid bottoms in merchant ships.

ARMY.

OFFICIAL.

May 1—Lieut. Col. J. Green, 6th Inf. ordered to join his regiment in Florida.

Major W. V. Cobbs, 5th Infy. ordered to Fort Winnebago.

Capt. J. R. Smith, 2d Infy. ordered to join his company at Fort Brady.

SPECIAL ORDER, No. 25, May 2—Sick leave for three months to Capt. S. Ringgold, 3d Artillery.

NAVY.

ORDERS.

May 1—Mid. B. F. Anderson, Naval School, Norfolk.

2—Asst. Sur. J. W. B. Greenhow, Naval Hospital, Pensacola, vice G. W. Evans, relieved at his own request.

5—Boats'n W. Whitehead, Navy Yard, Norfolk.

Boatswain J. Dunderdale, Ordinary. do.

7—Com'r. I. Mayo, permission to return from coast of Brazil.

Lieuts. M. Smith, and H. M. Houston, detached from W. I. squadron.

P. Mid. W. Pope, furlough 12 months.

Mid. J. B. Randolph, ship Erie.

Lt. H. K. Thatcher, det'd from ship Erie.

Mid. F. A. Parker and J. D. Usher, det'd from frigate Columbia.

APPOINTMENTS.

May 5—John Dunderdale, William Farrow, and William Whitehead, acting Boatswains.

RESIGNATION.

Joseph Norvell, acting Midshipman, May 1, 1833.

List of officers ordered to the ship Cyane, at Boston.

Commander, JOHN PERCIVAL.

Lieutenants, S. Lockwood, R. B. Hitchcock, S. F. Hazard, and J. F. Miller.

Surgeon, E. L. Dubarry. Ass't. Sur. C. J. Bates.

Purser, H. Bridge. Acting Master J. E. Brown.

Midshipmen, E. Allen, G. V. Fox, C. W. Place, C.

H. B. Caldwell, F. W. Colby, G. B. Balch, R. A.

Knapp, J. Downes, Jr., D. Williamson, George Wells,

A. McRae, H. A. Wise, Reed Werden, J. L. Worden.

E. F. Tattnall.

Boatswain, Wm. Farrow. Gunner, A. A. Peterson,

Carpenter, Chr. Jordan. Sailmaker, J. Ferguson.

MARRIAGE.

In New York, on the 1st inst. Captain THOMAS SWORDS, of the U. S. army, to CHARLOTTE AUGUSTA, daughter of DAVID COTHEAL, of that city.

DEATHS.

In this city, on Tuesday night, 1st inst., after a short illness, WILLIAM BALL, infant son of LEVIN HANDY, of the U. S. navy, aged 5 months and 14 days.

On the 28th ult., of pulmonary consumption, at the city of Williamsburg, Va., Mr. EDWIN A. TEAGLE, late Purser's clerk on board the U. S. frigate Constitution, in the 26th year of his age.